By Jim Constantopoulos
It seems implausible that now, with China dominating global mineral production and the U.S. vulnerable to a cutoff of imported minerals, the U.S. has allowed its military stockpile of critical raw materials for national defense to dwindle.
Hard as it might seem to believe, we do not have a clear national policy for mineral production, hindering our stockpile’s ability to satisfy mineral demand at key U.S. industrial sectors during a national emergency. Absent actions to maintain the defense stockpile at safe levels, the U.S. could be ill-prepared for a defense sector more reliant on batteries and renewable energy technologies — let alone a conflict with the world’s mineral superpower, China. The Defense Department has said that if strained relations with China turn into a military conflict, the U.S. would have shortfalls in 69 minerals, most of them used in weapons production.
For some minerals and metals, U.S. production has stopped completely. For example, the U.S. supply of niobium, which is used in steel and as a superalloy, has not been mined in the U.S. since 1959. Bismuth is used in U.S. defense systems, but it is not stockpiled. Moreover, in the event of a mineral shortage, the U.S. could not depend on its closest allies for critical raw materials. NATO has limited mineral production. The European Union imports between 75% and 100% of most metals it consumes, and neither the EU nor its member countries have stockpiles. Nor do Canada or Great Britain have mineral stockpiles.
A new study of military readiness by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace warns that the problems surrounding the U.S. mineral supply are terribly serious — and are likely to be permanent. The difficulty is not a lack of domestic resources but rather a lack of political will to produce them. Domestic mining for minerals is in a sort of political limbo. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, China is the leading producer of 29 of 43 key industrial minerals. Furthermore, the U.S. relies on China for about half of the critical minerals, including lithium, cobalt, and rare earths.
If war breaks out with China, U.S. merchant vessels can carry minerals across the Pacific and risk attacks by Chinese forces and bear the cost of sharply higher insurance premiums. Or they can sail thousands of extra miles by taking minerals around Africa, adding ten days in each direction. There is another option: send minerals overland by truck from mines in South America. None of these options are appealing, but the weaponization of global supply chains is something that must be taken seriously because of tense U.S. relations with China and dependence on China for critical minerals. Nor is China the only country with whom we have brittle relations. The U.S. imports nickel, titanium, uranium, and aluminum from Russia.
The threat to U.S. supply chains argues for a much larger mineral stockpile. And instead of relying on imports, the U.S. should procure domestically produced minerals where reserves exist. Such a policy would help facilitate domestic production. The U.S. should also consider prepaying for minerals to help fund a number of prospective mineral projects. It would help make U.S. mining more economically attractive — whether the minerals are used in commercial production or for stockpiles.
Can anything else be done to protect the U.S. against a sudden cutoff of critical minerals? Absolutely. The single most important thing that the federal government can do is shorten the permitting process for both new mines and processing facilities. The time was never riper for a national policy to support domestic mineral use and stimulate production.
Dr. Jim Constantopoulos is a Professor of Geology and the Director of the Miles Mineral Museum at Eastern New Mexico University.
Originally published by RealClearEnergy. Republished with permission.
